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The Contstructivistic Defence of the Objectivity 
of Moral Standards and Natural Law that Does 
not Require the Debate on Moral Realism
Abstract The main goal of Kenneth R. Westphal’s How Hume and Kant 
Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral 
Realism is to defend the objectivity of moral standards and natural law and thus 
avoid the discussion about moral realism and its alternatives by interpreting 
Hume and Kant in a constructivistic sense. The reason behind the author’s 
disagreement with both: moral realism and non-realism (its alternative) is our 
inability to properly understand and answer one of the two parts in Socrates’ 
question to Euthyphro: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is 
it pious because it is loved?“ Moral realists cannot provide an answer to its 
second part, since it is not possible to prove that moral standards are not artificial; 
conversely, moral non-realists cannot provide an answer to its first part, since 
it is not possible to avoid the relatitvity of moral standards. The author tends to 
solve this problem by avoiding the confrontation between moral realism and 
non-realism and thus choosing the constuctivistic stance that, as he argues, can 
be found in both Hume’s and Kant’s theories. The main point of this stance is 
that moral standards are indeed artificial, yet not arbitrary. He proves this by 
pointing out that both Hume and Kant treat the moral standards as a social fact 
(that is, artificial), but also as objective. Westphal points out that Hume explicitly 
writes about moral standards as a social fact, while showing that, at the same 
time, his theory of justice, which precedes all of the moral standards, is established 
independently of his theory of moral sentiments (potentially leading to moral 
relativism). In this manner, he provides the objectivity of those standards. On 
the other hand, Kant’s theory is interpreted as advanced, yet similar to Hume’s 
in its structure. The crucial similarity is that both Hume and Kant interpret the 
moral standards as a social fact (that is, as an artificial) and, at the same time, as 
the objective ones. Kant, unlike Hume, provides this objectivity by using a specific 
moral criterion – a categorical imperative. Those assumptions will be used as 
the main premises of a distinctively inspiring interpretation of Hume’s and Kant’s 
theories of justice.
Keywords: constructivism, objectivity, Hume, Kant, moral standards, theory of 
justice
Kenneth R. Westphal’s book How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: 
Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism is a remarkable un-
dertaking of discussing moral grounds and theory of justice that presuppose 
objectivity, while at the same time avoid getting into discussion about mor-
al realism and its alternatives, theory of motivation and ‘values’. The author 
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argumentatively develops this undertaking by interpreting Hume’s theory 
of justice and Kant’s normative theory as constructivistic theories.
Constructivism, as a form of Westphal’s interpretation of Hume’s and Kant’s 
theories, is the view that we are the ones that construct principles of acting, 
although they are not arbitrary. (p. 5) This allows the author to avoid dis-
cussion about moral realism and its alternatives, meaning that insofar as the 
moral principles are our own construct, there is no need to search for their 
further foundations. On the other hand, he tends to provide the objectivi-
ty of such principles, since it is, at least, very difficult to talk about relative 
or subjective morals and justice. The reason for his tendencies to avoid the 
discussion about moral realism and its alternatives is stated in the second 
chapter of the book.
In the second chapter Westphal analyzes following Socrates’ question to Eu-
thyphro: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious be-
cause it is loved?”1. Moral realists could answer the first part of the question, 
while moral non-realists could answer the second part. Moral realists, thus, 
claim that there are some objective moral standards (since piety, in this case, 
exists as independent), while non-realists claim that all of them are artificial 
(since piety is dependent, constructed value). Moral realists face a problem 
of proving that moral principles exist independently, meaning that they are 
not artificial. On the other hand, non-realists have difficulty avoiding rel-
ativism and conventional or arbitrary nature of moral standards. By inter-
preting Hume and Kant from a constructivistic standpoint, the author tends 
to avoid such problems and thus claims that moral standards are indeed ar-
tificial, however not arbitrary. (p. 17)
Non-arbitrarity (objectivity) is provided by external methods of judging. In 
order to prove that previous statement is correct, first it will be necessary 
to show that Hume and Kant can indeed be interpreted in constructivistic 
sense. In addition to that, author wants to point out that there is a specific 
connection between Hume and Kant, meaning that Kant deduced further 
consequences of the theory that Hume had previously concepted. Therefore, 
it’s Hume’s position that should be analyzed first of all.
In the third chapter, Westphal notices Hume’s establishment of theory of 
justice that is independent of his theory of moral sentiments. This is a very 
original insight, since Hume’s political philosophy is usually interpreted as 
an extension of his theory of moral sentiments. This insight is very profound 
as well, since, as it will be demonstrated, it provides Hume’s position with 
argumentative strength. Textual corroboration of mentioned stance author 
1  Plato (2007), Euthyphro, San Francisco, California, Creative Commons: p. 3-4; trans-
lated by Cathal Woods and Ryan Pack 
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discovers in the third part of Treatise on Human Nature, where Hume claims 
that norms are neither given from God, nor from nature, but (developed) 
from human nature and activity. This statement means that norms are ar-
tificial, however not arbitrary, since the term ’natural’ Hume interprets as 
’what is common (inseparable) to any species.’ (p. 28−29)
Hume in his theory of justice disagrees with non-social history of humanity 
(e.g. social contract) and instead discovers that the origin of justice lies within 
something grounded in reality – property. Here author points out that Hume 
doesn’t make a distinction between property and possession (p. 29). In latter 
parts of the book, this will turn out to be a problem that Kant overcomes.
Hume constructs his theory of justice by referring to five problems of so-
cial coordination: 1) “Under conditions of relative scarcity of external goods 
and limited benevolence typical of human nature, we require a system of 
possession in order to stabilize the distribution of goods.” (p. 31) “The rem-
edy, then”, as Hume claims, “is not derived from nature, but from artifice; 
or, more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy, in the judgment and 
understanding”. (p. 33) This leads to author’s conclusion that judgment and 
understanding mold and regulate the sentiments, which confirms the the-
sis that justice is not founded on sentiments. Hume’s notion of justice is not 
grounded in neither contract nor promise, but in conventions (reciprocal 
acts) of conduct, namely the social practice. This statement could be relat-
ed to latter Wittgenstein’s theory – in order to achieve an agreement, it is 
not necessary that one proclaims that agreement; rather, we “proclaim” it 
by our participation in a practice of agreement, just as we would row if we 
were in a boat – language is not explicitly needed in such situation. 2) “How-
ever, simply because we must respect a certain distribution and possession 
of goods does not itself provide or entail any principle”. (p. 35) Hume finds 
the solution to this problem of social coordination by claiming that one is 
a proprietor of what one already owns. 3) “Possession and property should 
always be stable, except when the proprietor consents to bestow them on 
some other person.” (p. 35) 4) Promises and contracts – they allow a distri-
bution of goods in different times and places. (p. 34−35) Those principles 
themselves are an artificial (non-arbitrary) useful creation. 5) Government 
– necessary as a protection of the previous four parts.
In order to completely understand Hume’s way of establishing theory of jus-
tice without referring to sentiments, the author gives two possible interpre-
tations of human sentiments: 1) “Sentiments are a necessary component or 
basis of moral judgments.” and 2) “Sentiments form a sole and sufficient basis 
of moral judgments.” In sentence ‘1)’ it is stated that sentiments are a neces-
sary, however not sufficient requirement of morals, while in ‘2)’ it is stated 
that sentiments are both necessary a sufficient requirement of morals. This 
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is followed by author’s observation that Hume finds a neutral observer – be-
ing someone who understands human sentiments, however is not ruled by 
them – a necessary part of adequate moral (and aesthetic, as well) judgment. 
Therefore, he concludes that it would be much more rational for Hume to 
accept ‘1)’, which allows theory of justice to be founded without referring 
to sentiments – moral sentiments are basis of moral judgments, yet they do 
not provide normativity. (p. 52)
In the following chapter Westphal shows that Hume’s theory of justice is in 
its essence externalistic, which (along with above mentioned reasons) gives it 
a constructivistic sense. In order to explain contructivistic position he refers 
to Christine Korsgaard, who is probably the most influential constructivist 
of our time. I won’t go into further details of Korsgaard’s position, since it 
is of little relevance for the strength of Westphal’s arguments, as well as be-
yond the scope of this review.
In the fifth chapter, author analyzes Kant’s principles of moral constructiv-
ism, which can be found in his account of universalizability. A maxim can 
be tested for universalizability by applying categorical imperative. Categor-
ical imperative is a normative moral principle, which, in its basic formula-
tion, demands to “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”2. If one, for example, 
tests the maxim of making deliberately false promises by applying this for-
mulation, it becomes clear that it would not pass the test. If making delib-
erately false promises became a universal law, then each individual would 
know that all the other individuals make false promises and, thus, the mak-
ing of false promises itself would become impossible. In order to achieve 
their goal, the one who makes a false promise must convince the other one 
that promise is sincere. However, if making false promises became a univer-
sal law, then the falsity itself would be revealed and, thus, would fail to help 
one to achieve their goals. Therefore, categorical imperative is a normative 
principle that excludes (treats as immoral) those maxims that, when univer-
salized, contain any kind of contradiction in conception. However, there are 
some acts that do not pass this test (a contradiction arises when the max-
im is universalized), although we trivially know that they are not immoral. 
Consider the situation in which two people want to pass through the same 
passage that is so narrow that only one person at a time can walk into it. 
If allowing the other person to pass through first became a universal law, 
that maxim would become contradictory when universalized, since no one 
would want to pass through first. Surely, this is a highly undesirable in any 
moral theory. Westphal provides a remarkable solution for this problem. He 
2  Kant, Immanuel (2008), Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, New Heaven and 
London, Yale University Press: p. 37
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suggests a two-step universalizability test. First step is already mentioned – 
a maxim is compared to its corresponding universalization. The second step 
is to compare the opposite maxim with its corresponding universalization. 
Results regarding the nature of this procedure are achieved when those two 
steps are compared in following manner:
If the maxim and its corresponding universalization pass the test and the 
opposite maxim and its corresponding universalization do not pass the test, 
then the act that is prescribed by the maxim is an ’ought!’ (binding).
If the maxim and its corresponding universalization do not pass the test 
and the opposite maxim and its corresponding universalization do pass the 
test, then the act prescribed by the maxim is an ’ought not!’ (prohibited, 
impermissible).
If the maxim and its corresponding universalization do pass the test and the 
opposite maxim and its corresponding universalization do pass the test or, if 
the maxim and its corresponding universalization do not pass the test and 
the opposite maxim and its corresponding universalization do not pass the 
test, then the act prescribed by the maxim is a ’may’ (permissible). (p. 82−83)
Let us see now if this helps with the case of allowing another person to pass 
through first; as it was previously mentioned, this maxim does not pass the 
first step. However, it does not pass the second step as well, since the opposite 
maxim would prescribe to prevent the others from passing through first – if 
everyone prevented the others from passing through first, there wouldn’t be 
“the others” to be prevented, so this maxim turns out contradictory. There-
fore, this is a case of ’may’ (permissible) acts, since the maxim passed neither 
first, nor the second step. On the other hand, making false promises, as it was 
shown, does not pass the first step, while at the same time passes the second 
one, since it is possible for a universal law of making true promises to exist, 
thus revealing that this is an ’ought not!’ (prohibited, impermissible) case. In 
this manner, Westphal avoids the parodies that could have been previous-
ly constructed within Kant’s ethics, while at the same time, in a remarkable 
sense, conserves a formality that is necessary for convincing justification of 
a constructivistic standpoint, which is, although somewhat arbitrary, still 
objective. By excluding those maxims that do not pass this constructed, but 
still formal (objective) test of universalization (e.g. extortion, deception, ex-
ploitation), we achieve the solution for fundamental problems of social co-
ordination and, at the same time, build a foundation of a justice theory that 
does not require a discussion regarding moral realism, its alternatives, the-
ory of moral motivation nor the ’values’.
In the sixth chapter, Westphal provides a further explanation and arguments 
for the previously mentioned thesis – Kant’s formalism is revealed through 
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his constructivism, namely it is not required to apply the universalizabili-
ty test on the values. (p. 95) Our behavior is constructed through applying 
the universalizability test and in order for such construction to be valid, it 
is necessary to follow these maxims: “1. always to think actively, 2. to think 
consistently, 3. to think (as far as possible) without prejudice and 4. to think 
from the standpoint of everyone else.” (p. 98) Here, he refers to Onora O’Neill 
who claims that maxims 1−4 are necessary conditions for a normal com-
munication. (It should be mentioned that O’Neill’s great influence is present 
throughout entire book, which Westphal himself admits to be true.3) In or-
der for communication to be possible, one must think correctly and correct 
thinking requires a reason that gives itself the laws. (p. 99) If we practiced a 
lawless use of reason, then someone or something else would prescribe the 
laws to us, which would negate the reasoning itself, since someone or some-
thing else would think instead of us. It is interesting to notice that the con-
sequence of this statement is that reasoning is a necessary requirement for 
freedom, since if someone or something else reasoned instead of us, then 
that someone or something else would also be making decisions instead of 
us. Therefore, the freedom would annihilate itself if it wished to break free 
from the laws of reason.
Further elaboration of constructivistic thesis now allows Westphal to argu-
mentatively avoid the discussion regarding values and thus, avoid the prob-
lem that arises from Socrates’ question to Euthyphro from the beginning of 
this review. On one hand, the moral standards are artificial (constructed), 
since they are a social fact, while on the other, they are, as it was previous-
ly shown, objective, since that objectivity comes from the moral criteria in 
the form of categorical imperative. The first part of this statement is addi-
tionally supported by Kant’s fallibilistic thesis. This thesis can be formulat-
ed in a following manner: our fallibility makes all our justifications merely 
a social phenomenon and, further, our current state of knowledge is what 
counts as relevant. That further means that justification is a pragmatic and 
historic phenomenon, that is not based on the absolute (fundamental) con-
cept of justification (which is referred to in one part of Socrates’ question) 
and, thus, it follows that this concept has been changing throughout histo-
ry. (p. 109−110) This allows us to avoid the circularity that can arise from 
socratean type of questions. The other part of his question (which questions 
the state in which the moral standards are understood as relative) is, as it was 
previously mentioned, resolved by categorical imperative. The author also 
thinks (and convincingly argues) that some of the relatively related theories 
(such as the theory of social contract, as well as some of the contemporary 
theories) fail to provide adequate answers to socratean type of questions (to 
3  The book is dedicated to Onora O’Neill.
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its first, second or both parts), however further explanation of these argu-
ments would require going well beyond the scope of this review and, thus, 
leaving less room for the more relevant issues.
In seventh chapter Westphal relies on the findings of previous chapters and 
now applies them to Kant’s concept of justice, which is the central notion 
of this book. So far, two things have been shown: first, that someone’s act is 
right, if that someone’s freedom can coexist with everyone else’s freedom ac-
cording to universal law (categorical imperative) and, second, that if someone 
wants to achieve some ends, they also want all the available means to those 
ends (hypothetical imperative). This allows Kant to formulate the rights to 
usage and acquisition: a) human beings cannot will their ends into existence 
ex nihilo (we must make use of materials around us), b) ends we choose to 
pursue are complex, temporarily extended and, more or less, integrated (it 
is impossible that everyone simultaneously possesses everything), c) we live 
in finite time and space which entails d) that we are sufficiently populous, so 
that we cannot avoid relative scarcity and influence our actions have on the 
others. (p. 128-129) Here, author points out the similarities between con-
ditions a)−d) and previously mentioned Hume’s account of relative scarci-
ty and limited human generosity, which is another example of resemblance 
between Hume’s and Kant’s theory or, more precisely, that Kant’s theory is 
upgraded version of Hume’s.
The question that now arises regards the possibility of social coordination 
in situations where the conditions ‘a)−d)’ are met. It has already been men-
tioned that categorical and hypothetical imperative are foundations of ‘a)−d)’; 
this means that our properties4 must be coordinated in such manner that 
the everyone else’s freedom remains uncompromised, which entails that the 
scope of our freedom is defined by the scope of others’. Further, it entails 
that all of us have a relatively similar scope, as well as that the others cannot 
become our property (since it would jeopardize their freedom).5 This entails 
that we all live in a state of relative scarcity, that we all tend to achieve some 
ends (and, thus, materials), and since we do not have the right to jeopardize 
the others’ actions as long as they do not jeopardize ours, a relatively equal 
distribution of goods shall be achieved. (p. 130-131)
In the chapter “Kant’s Justification of Rights to Usufruct”, Westphal notic-
es that Kant, unlike Hume, makes a great difference between ‘property’ and 
‘usufruct’. Kant has the idea of establishing a priori either the notion of ‘prop-
erty’ or the notion of ‘usufruct’, that will entail the notion of justice. That 
notion cannot be ‘property’, since the property entails (1) the right to possess 
4  ‘Property’ is not understood as a technical term here.
5  A direct application of Westphal’s ‘contradiction in conception’ can be noticed here.
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(object manipulation), (2) the right to use, (3) the right to manage (to lend an 
object or to forbid others to use it), (4) the right to an income from a thing, 
(5) the right to capital in the thing, (6) the right to security, (7) transmissibil-
ity of things, (8) the prohibition that thing applies the damage to others, (9) 
liability to execution (to have property taken away for serious debt), (10) the 
right of residuary (the right to be returned to owner when the debt is paid). 
On the other hand, the notion of ‘usufruct’ implies characteristics ‘(1)’, ‘(2)’ 
and ‘(8)’ which can be established a priori. (p. 146-148) The similarity be-
tween this notion and Hume’s constructivistic analyses of ‘the rules of justice’ 
(property, promise and contract). Then, by the usage of universalizability test 
(contradiction in conception), Kant establishes the concept of ‘usufruct’ as 
moral principle (without referring to any social practice). Also, the concept 
of ‘usufruct’ entails the concepts of promise, exchange and contract, as well 
as public justice (which Kant refers to as republican government).
Author provides three assumptions that require the right to usufruct (or – if 
these three assumptions weren’t valid, there would be no need for the right to 
usufruct): A. we cannot will our ends into existence ex nihilo (we must make 
use of materials around us), B. ends we choose to pursue are complex, tem-
porarily extended and, more or less, integrated (e.g. home and food are more 
or less integrated, since our existence depends on both), C. we are sufficiently 
populous, so we cannot avoid mutual influence (others’ ends). By using ‘A.-C.’ 
and test for contradiction in conception that is based on the results stated in 
fifth chapter, Westphal uses really strong and convincing arguments (three 
intuitive facts and argumentatively already proven interpretation of Kant’s 
test of contradiction in conception) and proves the right to usufruct. We 
should keep in mind the premise that we can possess the things that are not 
physically present. Let us suppose the Maxim of Arrogant Willing (MAW); 
whenever I need the means that others possess as well, I will consider those 
means under my control and use them for my own ends. There are three 
circumstances in which, as the author claims, it is possible to universalize 
(to apply the test of contradiction in conception) MAW: A) there is enough 
of the replaceable resources (means) that no one is using, B) someone gives 
up the ends, if the person that owns the means (to those ends) forbids their 
usage and C) someone allows the usage of the means they own if they are 
necessary for some ends. ‘A)’ passes the test, because the person never has to 
use someone else’s means. ‘B)’ also passes the test, since the person stoical-
ly gives up the means, however ‘C)’ does not pass the test, since it is possi-
ble that someone needs all of their means. The problem for MAW is that ‘A)’ 
and ‘B)’, unlike ‘C)’ contradict the intuitive assumptions ‘A.-C.’, so, therefore, 
MAW is not valid. Therefore, the right to usufruct must be honored (above 
all, its first assumption – the right to possess). (p 160−161)
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We can acquire an object if we start using it before someone else possesses 
it. This is a legitimate way of acquiring, since no one is harmed by the usage 
and the right to usufruct is honored. Therefore, this entails that we have an 
obligation to respect others’ acquired objects as well as that such obligation is 
not unilateral, since the others are finite and rational as well. Author points 
out that stated argument says nothing about the liberal private property, nor 
about any other stronger rights; it is concerned only with the right to usu-
fruct, that is the right to possess, not to a property. In the end, he concludes 
his argument by claiming that nothing in the world’s order gives an answer 
to the question of possession, namely that we can possess the things only in 
relation to others (that is by their permission of such possession – if they 
permit us to possess it or if it is not already possessed by someone else). (p. 
161) This is another representation of Kant’s constructivistic thesis – the 
right to usufruct is a social (constructed) fact, which is established in order 
to achieve social coordination. This right has nothing to do with the struc-
ture of the world itself and instead it is an artificial, however not arbitrary 
(subjective or relative) invention.
Although, as it has already been shown, the right to usufruct is necessary, it 
still remains conditional, although not optional. It is conditional, since it is 
possible to construct two situations in which it would no longer be valid: 
first possible world is the one in which owning the objects kills the others 
and second possible world is the one in the state of enormous scarcity (own-
ing an object would strongly endanger the others). Neither of those worlds 
would allow the right to usufruct, since it would not pass the test of contra-
diction in conception. On the other hand, in a world, such as the actual one, 
in which the (not so ’extreme’) assumptions ’A.-C.’ are valid, it is prohibited 
to restrict the right to usufruct, since that maxim cannot be universally ac-
cepted (it fails the test of contradiction in conception6), which is the reason 
why this right cannot be optional. (p. 170)
In conclusion the author sums up and additionally explains the line of argu-
ment that is followed throughout the book. He points out that the aim of his 
study is to establish the constructivistic standpoint, that had been conceived 
by Hume in the III book of Treatise on Human Nature and later significantly 
developed within Kant’s doctrine of justice that establishes objective moral 
principles without referring to moral realism or its alternatives. During that 
endeavor he refers to externalism of justification that conserves cognitiv-
ism and moral principles without ’truth makers’. Once again, he points out 
that constructivism is argumentatively stronger than moral realism, since it 
6  According to analysis of the test of contradiction in conception that is represented 
in the fifth chapter, readers can deduce for themselves why this maxim fails the test.
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provides an answer to socratean type of questions. It succeeds in it by mov-
ing the discussion away from the moral motivation.
Kenneth R. Westphal’s study is an exceptionally ambitious as well as suc-
cessful enterprise of founding the constructivistic standpoint in Hume’s and 
Kant’s theories of justice. In addition to that, we are shown the way of merg-
ing those two theories into one, Kant’s being the upgraded version of Hume’s 
theory. This provides the stated claims with an outstanding cohesion and ar-
gumentative depth. The author begins with abstract, however intuitive con-
structions, such as an effort to separate Hume’s theory of moral sentiments 
from his theory of justice. He does the similar procedure with Kant’s notion 
of contradiction in conception and in conclusion uses both of those theories 
to infer the notion of justice as a part of one “practical” concept. These steps 
were, considering the author’s argumentative ambition, necessary, since it 
would not be possible to convincingly infer such notion of justice with-
out thorough analysis of Hume’s theory of sentiments and Kant’s notion of 
contradiction in conception. Perhaps the most relevant consequence of this 
study is that Westphal managed to show the relevance of the two authors that 
have lived more than two centuries before our time and have inspired stand-
point that is, by our current standards, still extremely attractive and repre-
sented. Even more impressive is that the author managed to prove Hume’s 
and Kant’s superiority to many of the contemporary authors dealing with 
this subject and he does so by showing how further they had gone in their 
arguments. I would strongly recommend the book How Hume and Kant Re-
construct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Re-
alism to anyone interested in ethical, meta-ethical and political problems, as 
well as to anyone willing to achieve a deeper and argumentatively stronger 
insight into the constructivistic standpoint.
Славенко Шљукић
Конструктивистичка одбрана објективности моралних 
стандарда и природног закона без улажења у расправу 
о моралном реализму
Апстракт
Главни циљ књиге How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying 
Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism Кенета Р. Вестфала је да 
успостављањем конструктивистичке позиције код Хјума и Канта одбрани 
објективност моралних стандарда и природног закона и на тај начин из-
бегне расправу о моралном реализму и његовим алтернативама. Аутор 
сматра да је потребно избећи ову расправу, јер уколико се приклонимо 
моралном реализму или моралном не-реализму (његовој алтернативи), 
нећемо моћи да обухватимо један или други део питања које Сократ упућује 
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Еутифрону а које гласи: „Да ли је побожно биће вољено од стране богова 
јер је побожно, или је побожно зато што је вољено од стране богова?“. Мо-
ралним реализмом се не може обухватити други део, јер се не може по-
казати да морални стандарди нису вештачки, док моралним не-реализмом 
не може први, јер се не може избећи релативизам моралних стандарда. 
Овај проблем аутор настоји да реши тако што ће заобићи конфронтацију 
моралног реализма и не-реаилзма заузимајући позицију конструктивизма, 
коју налази и утемељује код Хјума и Канта, а којом се тврди да морални 
стандарди јесу вештачки, али не арбитрарни. То показује тако што и код 
Хјума и код Канта проналази да моралне стандарде третирају као социјал-
ну чињеницу (као вештачке), али и као нешто објективно. Вестфал при-
мећује да Хјум експлицитно пише о моралу као социјалној чињеници, али 
показује да је његова теорија правде, којој подлежу морални принципи, 
изграђена невезано од његове теорије моралних сентимената (која може 
одвести у релативизам), те на тај начин обезбеђује објективност ових прин-
ципа. Кантову теорију, са друге стране, интерпретира као знатно унапређе-
ну, али структурално сличну, Хјумовој. Ова сличност огледа се у томе што 
се морални стандарди такође интерпретирају као социјална чињеница (као 
вештачки), и као објективни. Објективност, сада за разлику од Хјума, Кант 
добија спрецифичним моралним критеријумом – категоричким императи-
вом. Наведене поставке аутор користи као премисе за веома инспиративну 
интерпретацију Хјумове и Кантове теорије правде.
Кључне речи: конструктивизам, објективност, Хјум, Кант, морални стан-
дарди, теорија правде

